Heuristic
Ευρετικός κανόνας
A shortcut that answers a hard question by quietly swapping it for an easier one. It is economical and usually works, and it fails in systematic directions, which is the part that makes it learnable rather than shameful.
How to spot it
Ask whether your answer would have been different if the first example, or the first number, had been different. If it would, the shortcut answered and not you.
The research behind the term
The term is not our invention. It comes from published research, and what follows is what that research found — our own synthesis of the published abstract, not a translation of the original.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases — doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124
What it found
- Three heuristics we use when judging under uncertainty are described: representativeness, availability, and adjustment from an anchor.
- Representativeness is engaged when we judge the probability that an object or event belongs to a category.
- Availability is engaged when we estimate the frequency of a category or the plausibility of a development, on the basis of how easily instances come to mind.
- These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable errors.
How it found it
A theoretical article synthesizing the authors' experimental findings on judgment under uncertainty into three general mechanisms with predictable deviations.
What it means for decision making
Errors of judgment are not random: because they are predictable, you can learn exactly where to be suspicious of yourself.
Practised in
The term does not stay a definition. It appears inside missions where the pattern happens in real time and you have to recognise it as it happens to you.
The Story and the First Number
Sources
Every claim on this page maps to published research. The citations link to the original source.
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases — doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124